would not restrain the continuing march of the discussion since different historical epoch would bring its own dynamics to bear on the conceptualisation of the state. This work is not necessarily intended to be a layer to the strata of material on state theory. It nevertheless revises, in a very limited fashion, the nature of the state and the dilemma that poses for development initiatives in the developing world.
The post colonial state in many developing countries has been described as "weak", "soft", "patrimonial", "leviathan" and "inefficient". 5 It is weak because it is one that has to survive on fragile coalitions of disparate ethnic allegiances and economic, if predatory, interests. 6 It is soft because rules and policies, which are often ad hoc in the continuing realignment of the various interests, are routinely violated by people with influence in the corridors of political, economic or social power. It is patrimonial because of the character of the institutional arrangements which often place personal loyalty above merit. It is leviathan because it is all encompassing and totalitarian in its apparent control of the society. All this should inevitably point to inefficiency. That inefficiency is manifested in the state's micro economic activities. The reason is that the weak institutional arrangement exacerbates that state's comparative disadvantage in business activity. Paradoxically, it is this fragile state that was expected to step in to break the vicious cycle of under-development and poverty which existed at the dawn of independence, when it was thought that the dearth of indigenous private capital left the state as the only alternative for capital mobilisation and investment. 7 This ideology largely held sway in many developing countries until the end of the cold war. 8 In many countries, the state was an active and direct participant in economic enterprises. Many of these enterprises did not yield the desired results. The question then is, should the state have concentrated on building itself first before engaging in capital mobilisation, or the status quo should have been maintained until the invisible hand of the market touched the people? This is a dilemma that faced many governments of the developing world. Many of them sought to do both. Build a strong and effective state and also mobilise 180 departure from policies pursued by the displaced government. 21 In the main, the colonial government could be said to have operated market economic policies but focused on the function of the colony as supplier of raw material for the United Kingdom and market for finished products. 22 Kwame Nkrumah significantly pursued socialist state-led development policies, 23 although he did not pursue a grand nationalisation programme, 24 and also welcomed private foreign capital including foreign investment in the energy sector. 25 The NLC and the Busia governments which followed after Nkrumah pursued patently market economic policies, devalued the currency, privatised many state enterprises and focused more on rural development programmes. 26 The Acheampong led NRC/SMC halted the privatisation process, re-valued the currency and sought to put the "commanding heights" of the Ghanaian economy in the hands of the Ghana Government. 27 The Limann government 21 For a general discussion of the political economy of Ghana since independence and an outline of some of the significant economic policies implemented by various governments from 1958-1989, see M.M. Huq, The Economy of Ghana: The First 25 Years After Independence 1989, xxviixxviii. Rimmer, supra note 13. It must be noted that most of the literature on the political economy of Ghana since independence substantially reflect the political leanings of the respective authors. Some of them like Yankah were official spokespeople of the Rawlings group. The political developments also affected the legal system, in particular the nature and titles of statutes. Principal statutes passed by the colonial administration were referred to as Ordinances, those passed by civilian constitutional governments (1957-1966, 1969-1972, 1979-1981 and 1992-) are referred to as Acts. The Military or quasi-military juntas variously referred to the statutes they passed as Decrees (1966 Decrees ( -1969 Decrees ( , 1972 Decrees ( -1979 and Laws (1982 Laws ( -1992 , and used their collective names as the short titles for the statutes. For example National Liberation Council Decree (NLCD) or Provisional National Defence Council Law (PNDCL). These terms may be prevalent in the ensuing sections of this work. 22 Rhoda Howard, supra note 13, at p. 11 (1978) . Mehran Kamrava, Politics and Society in the Third World, 1993, p. 37-38. For a comprehensive report of colonial policy see G.B. Kay, The Political Economy of Colonialism in Ghana: A Collection of Documents and Statistics 1900 -1960 , 1972 , at p. 42 and the entire text. 23 The view that Dr. Nkrumah followed socialist policies have been challenged. Richard Rathborne for example describes it as false assumption. See Richard Rathborne, Ghana, in: John Dunn (ed.), West African States, 1978, p. 26. 24 Any "nationalisation" that took place was a purchase of loss making moribund enterprises such as the mines at Konongo and Tarkwa mainly to starve off unemployment. See Tony Killick, supra note 7, at p. 257-266, Rimmer, supra note 13, at p. 164. 25 David Hart, The Volta River Project, 1984, and James Moxon, Volta: Man's Greatest Lake, 1984. 26 Rimmer, supra note 13, at p. 29. Rathborne supra note 23, takes a different view that Busia pursued rural development agenda, saying that rural farmers were still deprived of the benefits of their productivity. 27 Ibid., at p. 30. Rimmer, supra note 13, at p. 165. See for example Mining Operations (Government Participation) Decree, 1972 (NRCD 132) . Bringing the "commanding heights" of the economy was not unique nor novel to Acheampong's Ghana. The British Labour Party, when in power in the post war period, also flagged that rhetoric. See Steve Thomas, The Privatization of the Electricity Supply Industry, in: John Surrey (ed.), The British Electricity Experiment: Privatisation: The Record, The Issues, The Lessons, 1996, p. 43. initiated the liberalisation of trade and started negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank towards broader economic reform but was overthrown before he could launch the reform package. Jerry Rawlings initially pursued "socialist" but largely undisciplined policies. 28 Boards of public corporations were replaced by shop floor workers and some companies were taken over by "cadres of the revolution". 29 Price controls were imposed, peoples tribunals created and Citizens Vetting Committee established to vet the "rich". 30 Two years of drought, influx of Ghanaians from Nigeria and failure to secure genuine and significant economic help from Libya and former communist countries, forced Rawlings to make a "U turn" 31 from what he called "populist nonsense" and followed an IMF/World (1984) . Ghana was one of the first countries to implement the Bretton Woods designed Structural Adjustment Programme and so has attracted substantial commentary from mainly economic and political commentators. Most of these works have some introduction on the recent, mainly post independence, political and economic history of the country before they plunge into a discussion of the working of the structural adjustment programme. Some of these include the following; Jeffrey Herbst, The Politics of Reform in Ghana, 1992; John Akokpari, The Contradiction Between the Economic and Political Liberalization in Ghana, (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Dalhousie University, 1996); Ho Wong Jeong, Liberal Economic Reform in Ghana, in: 42 Africa Today (1995) . As far as the energy sector is concerned, As far as energy is concerned, the colonial administration maintained a diesel generating station and did not intend any rigorous energy programme. 35 It was the Nkrumah government that initiated the Volta River Project and saw to its completion. The NLC government created the Electricity Corporation of Ghana. 36 Negotiations for the export of power to Togo and Benin was initiated during the Busia era and completed in the first year of the Acheampong regime in 1972. 37 The Kpong project began under Acheampong and commissioned by Limann. Limann revived plans for the Bui project but was shelved by Rawlings. 38 Rawlings initiated the rural electrification programme which saw extension of power to the northern regions of Ghana. 39 It is also at the instance of his government that the Combined Cycle Gas Turbine project commenced. 40 Generally, there has been little investment in the energy industry since the overthrow of Dr. Nkrumah. 41 The ECG regressed continually into inefficiency and the institutional supervision of the industry has been ad hoc, at best. 42 Remarkably though, apart from minimal investment, the VRA structure, operation and income had escaped almost unscathed from the vicissitudes of political and bureaucratic instability.
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subsidies were not withdrawn from the supply of electricity to domestic consumers until the late 1990s, and the privatisation or restructuring of the utilities is still at the planning stages. 35 The 10 year development plan launched in 1923, seen as the most ambitious colonial development programme, but abandoned in 1927 following the departure of Governor Guggisberg, earmarked 75 percent of the projected £ 24 million for transport and the rest for water supply, drainage, electricity 39 The legislation establishing the VRA and the ECG were amended to put the VRA directly in charge of the Northern Electrification programme. See Volta River Development (Amendment) Law, 1986 (PNDCL 170) and Electricity Corporation of Ghana (Amendment) Law, 1986 (PNDCL 171). The northern electrification programme was followed by the Self-Help Electrification Project (SHEP) to support the efforts of rural communities to provide power for themselves. See 'Communities in Ashanti to Get Electricity', Ghana News Agency, Report at http://www.uta.fi/ ¬csfraw/ghana/news/oct/reel_21.1.html (visited 22 October 1997). 40 See 'VRA, US Company to Manage Thermal Plant', Ghanaian Times, 1 October 1996 at p. 12.
Ghanaian Times, 3 October 1996 at p. 8. 41 Apart from the completion of the Kpong hydro-electric project which was part of the original Akosombo project, virtually nothing new happened until the 1990s. 42 See text below.
Since attaining independence in 1957, Ghana has sought, especially in the first postindependence decade, to diversify its economy from dependence on the export of monocrop and imports of industrial materials. 44 In line with economic thinking at the time, 45 this entailed massive state-led industrialisation drive. An essential condition for the industrialisation and rapid development programme was the need for cheap and abundant energy.
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The sprinkling of few diesel generators in some of the urban areas of the country prior to independence was not the kind that could effectively facilitate the realisation of the dream of post-independent equitable development and industrialisation. Based on prior studies of the possibility of exploiting the waters of the river Volta for a complex hydro electricity bauxite processing and irrigation of the Accra plains, 47 the then President of Ghana made a singular commitment and effort to see to the generation of power from the Volta. 48 The story of the energy industry in Ghana is very much the story of the Volta hydro electricity project. Not only is the project entrancing in its working but also it engendered a legal regime that is largely unique in Ghana and in the trade as a whole.
The first attempt at constructing a modern legal framework for the energy industry in Ghana was in 1920 when the Electricity Supply Ordinance was passed. 49 It provided for 184 was and remains a state-owned utility responsible for limited thermal power generation, but general responsibility for domestic power distribution. Until the mid 1990s, the generation of power was largely the preserve of the Volta River Authority (VRA). The VRA was established in 1961 for the generation of power from the river Volta and transmission of the power so generated. It was also given the mandate to distribute power to selected consumers directly. These include the Volta Aluminum Company, formed by two American multinational companies to buy power in bulk from the VRA to convert bauxite into alumina, the Mines and Akosombo town-ship. 53 Between 1972 and 1995, it sold power to Togo and Benin 54 and in 1987 it was charged with the distribution of power to the northern parts of Ghana, which were hitherto not connected to the national grid. 55 Beyond electricity, the country has seen significant developments in petroleum activity. Exploration for oil, since the 1970s has yielded little interesting results but showed proven gas reserves. 56 The exploration for and development of petroleum resources, in addition to the importation of crude oil, is the preserve of the State Owned Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC).
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The GNPC has established an Independent Power Producing Company (Western Power Company) to generate power from gas reserves in the Tano basin of the western region. 54 The sale to VALCO and export to Togo and Benin was suspended in 1983-84 due to drought and consequent low levels of water in the dam. Between 1989 and 1994, it also exported power to Ivory Coast, but since 1995, it has been importing from that country to supplement local supplies which could not keep up with increasing demand. It is currently constructing a Combined Cycle Gas Plant in the western region of the country to generate power from gas deposits. 55 The law establishing the VRA (Act 46) had to be amended to make provision for the power distribution in the north. See Volta River Development Act (Amendment) Law 1987 (PNDC Law 171) and Electricity Corporation of Ghana (Amendment) Law 1987 (PNDC Law 172). 56 The Tano basin alone has more than 287 billion cubic feet of proven gas reserves. See 'Ghana Floating Power Plant', infra, note 58. 57 The GNPC was established by the Petroleum Exploration and Development Law of 1983 (PNDC Law 84). The monopoly on the importation was revised in 1996. 'Ghana to Liberalise Oil Imports', http://www.uta.fi/csfraw/ghana/ ews/enews.html (visited 17/9/96). 58 This is in fact a joint venture project with three U.S based companies. The turbines were built by Westinghouse of Florida. See 'Ghana Floating Power Plant', located at http://www.uta.fi/ csfraw/ghana/news/feb/1202_5.html (visited 18/2/97). 59 The Government is set to privatise the GOIL and the Tema Oil Refinery. See 'Ghana Speeds. Up
IV. Governance Structure of the Energy Industry
The global oil crisis in the 1970s provided the impetus for the establishment of a govern- 65 Tariffs were adjusted upwards in 1997 to reflect the true costs (Long Run Marginal Cost) of providing the service, but this was also at a time when water levels in the Volta river were very low due to drought. There was severe public dissatisfaction with the industry as a whole and the new rates in particular. This was the immediate springboard for the creation of the PUC, Daily Graphic 12/9/97. 66 See section 3 of Act 538 of 1997. 67 The Ministry of Finance is the approval authority for investment initiatives of the VRA. This, however, is rare as there has been very limited investment by the VRA. See Brew-Hammond, supra note 38, at p. 337 (footnote 19).
try of Mines and Energy and its predecessor were created at the height of national crisis. They were, as to be expected, staffed by personnel with general training but little expertise in the technicalities of the industry. In addition, they were, in the main, ad hoc institutions with frequent connections to other sectors such as lands, natural resources and mines. 68 The instability at the governmental supervisory levels were dictated mainly by economic priorities of the government for the time being in power as well as by direct political circumstances. The Ministry of Fuel and Power was originally Ministry of Fuel, Power, Lands and Natural Resources, but was pruned to Fuel and Power after the overthrow of the founding military dictator. 69 The Ministry of Mines and Energy was created mainly as part of the then Military government's reform of the mining sector which also saw a substantial improvement in the performance of the mining industry and therefore greater reliance on it for economic survival. 70 The permeation of politics and its consequences for the industry is patently exemplified by the abolition of the NEB.
The NEB was created in 1983 as a largely independent technically oriented institution to initiate, co-ordinate and assess energy policy and advise government on the same. 71 In one way, its creation can be seen as a multiplication of institutions and a duplication of the functions of the Ministry of Energy. In its working, however, it served as a wedge between government and industry thereby forestalling more direct (and potentially) destructive governmental interference in the industry. It generated its own funds, attracted and retained personnel with technical expertise and had control over its staff and assets. 72 To that extent it was independent and suitably placed in the ethos of Weberian bureaucracy, necessary for effective development. 73 Its effort to maintain this independence while rigorously pursuing its objectives attracted governmental discontent and with no reasons given, the NEB was dissolved. With that dictatorial act, the hopes and prospects of a scientific institutional management of the industry waned. This represents abuse of governmental discretion by an undemocratic government not adhering to the rule of law nor the tenets of legal rational bureaucracy. That the industry survived these crises and appear to be moving forward is due to other factors including, paradoxically, continuing state support. These are taken up 68 In fact, the physical locations of their offices also changed, at least, once. 
V. Organisational Structure of Power Utilities
The VRA's legal status is emasculated in the Volta River Development Act of 1961. It is charged with the generation of power from the Volta river and by other means, the construction and operation of a transmission system for the transmission of the power it generates. 74 To achieve these goals, a unique organisational structure was created under the law.
What may be described as the Board of Directors is called the Authority, and is vested with wide powers. Until 1966, the President of Ghana was the ex officio chairman, but currently that function is performed by a person appointed by the head of state. 75 The board is composed of seven members appointed by the head of state. 76 The membership of the board include the Chief Executive of the VRA and two representatives of major consumers of the power generated by the VRA. 77 The tenure of office of the members of the board is basically at the discretion of the President. He appoints, and although the Act prescribes a three-year term, the President could dismiss at any time any member of the board if he deemed that the interest of the Authority required that. 78 It must be pointed out, however, that although the President appoints the Chief Executive, the appointment must be approved by the World Bank. 79 The Chief Executive is in charge of the day-to-day management of the VRA and has power over the appointment and discipline of staff.
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The organisational structure of the VRA is intriguing, to say the least. The President's direct and personal involvement is both a route for and a manifestation of the "politicisation" of the organisation. The failure of the government could, in theory, sound the deathknell of the utility. It is also an avenue for the patrimonisation of the utility, and that clearly would be at odds with the tenets of good governance. In reality, however, and paradoxically, the unique organisational structure has been acknowledged as one of the essential foundations for the world-acclaimed success of the VRA. 81 The arrangement, it is submit- ted, is a recognition of the "weak" nature of the general state apparatus in Ghana at the time and the consequent inefficiencies in the public bureaucratic system. 82 The magnitude of the investment outlay involved in the project and the diverse interests connected to it resulted in its attaining the features of a state on its own. 83 By placing the administration directly under the President's office, the VRA was able to escape the administrative bottlenecks and red tape that bedevil other State enterprises. 84 Apart from showing President Nkrumah's intense interest, understanding of the mechanics of the project and his determination to see to its success, the President's involvement also helped assuage doubts that existed in the minds of financial and other interests in the project.
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The organisational structure of the Electricity Company is not very different from that of the VRA. However, due to the realisation of potential politicisation of the VRA, the statute establishing the ECG attempts to prevent that. This is done by the prescription that "no person shall qualify to be a member of the board who is a member of any assembly or other body having for the time being authority to enact laws which have effect throughout Ghana." 86 As in the case of the VRA, the President appoints the members of the board but the law requires that the persons to be appointed must have had experience of and demonstrated competence in public utility operations, electricity management, business, finance, science or administration, 87 and not more than one of such persons must be a government employee. The specified eligibility criteria, however, is such that members might not be far 82 The removed from the political process. For example, the Chief Executive of the VRA who is appointed by the President is an ex officio member, and so are two others who must be administrative heads of two civil service departments. In addition, the President appoints both the chair of the board and the Chief Executive of the ECG. 88 Unlike the VRA, the ECG is firmly located under the civil service system supervised variously by the Ministry of Works, Power and Energy. It does not have direct access to the President's office. It has also fared poorly by all indications and especially in comparison to the VRA. 89 Clearly, its location in the inefficient and unstable public system contributed to the dismal performance. There are other contributory factors such as financial and commercial arrangements.
a) Commercial Arrangements
The financial arrangements leading to the eventual establishment of the Volta river project was complicated and was one of the primary reasons for the central role the state played and continues to play in the industry. From its original conception in 1915, three bases of finance were sourced. The first was private investment by a consortium of interests. 90 This failed. The second was a joint British government and Gold Coast government loan and limited private sources. When the prices of aluminium slumped and the cost estimates were revised upwards, the British government withdrew. 91 The third source was a Ghana government and World Bank loan. This was conditioned upon private aluminium smelter being established as the immediate and primary consumer of the power generated. That involved two American multinational companies -Kaiser Aluminium and Reynolds Metals -forming a joint-venture -Volta Aluminium Company (VALCO) 92 -to build a smelter to buy the power to be used in smelting bauxite from Guyana into aluminium ingots. In fact, the Jackson Commission which researched and co-ordinated the planning of the Volta project 88 Ibid. This amendment also specifies that three members of the board must be representatives of industrial, rural and other consumers of power. This gives a bent in favour of consumer interests which is mainly cheap tariffs, and that could undermine the long term viability of the utility. 89 See table infra. 90 Moxon, supra note 25, at p. 83-92. 91 Ibid. 190 recommended substantial financial involvement of the government of Ghana. 93 Due to its faith in the viability of the project and its expected contribution to the industrial development of the country, the Nkrumah government was prepared to commit substantial financial outlay to it. The international business dynamics at play and the government's commitment to the project, permeated the financial provisions in the statute establishing the VRA and the ECG.
Under the Volta Development Act, the state "shall invest in the Volta River Development such sums, not exceeding thirty five million pounds, as the Authority may require for the discharge of its functions under the Act". 94 It is important to note that the investment money was attached to the gradual development of the project and disbursed in instalments. It was also limited to a ten-year period. 95 The VRA was required to pay a return on that investment to the state. The terms of repayment were, however, very generous. For example, the period for repayment was to be negotiated with the Minister for Finance, and repayment was conditioned upon adequate financial provisions made by the Authority for reserves, depreciation, interest payments on other loans and its future financial commitments. 96 Apart from direct state funds, the Authority has power to contract loans from commercial and other lenders to meet its capital expenditure and recurrent budget needs.
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It could also issue debentures and bonds to secure repayment of the loans and interests. As collateral, it may charge its assets and revenues with the repayments. 98 The President could stipulate the maximum amounts that the Authority may borrow. 99 Significantly, the state may guarantee these financial transactions and the guarantee may be charged to the consolidated fund. 100 It can be concluded that the VRA is tied to the state as far as its financial obligations are concerned. That conclusion is, however, undermined by the complete control the Authority has over its income, especially the receipts from the exports of power and sale to VALCO. strictly at the instance of the Authority. 101 This has made it possible for the VRA to hire needed experts and order necessary equipment without inevitable bureaucratic hindrances. To Brew-Hammond, this is a critical factor in the VRA success story.
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The latitude for borrowing by the ECG is similar to those of the VRA. In the case of the ECG, however, limits on the amount to be borrowed and the guarantees for repayments are to be done by the Minister for Finance and not the President. Although it might reduce the depths of political involvement, the difference in the approval authority has no impact on the nature of the obligations and consequences of the loan agreements. 103 The ECG is also a direct beneficiary of state capital. The government bears the cost of capital accumulation and development works. 104 Unlike the Volta River Development Act, the ECG Decree has no provision for the repayment of the state investments in the ECG. It only has to pay, from time to time, into the consolidated fund such sums as the Board may after consultation with the Minister for Finance, and having regard to future financial commitments, think fit.
Both utilities are exempted from paying tax on their respective incomes. 105 This is unique in Ghana. 106 It could be that at their inception, such exempt status was thought necessary to facilitate their establishment and growth. That proposition is undermined by the fact that not only was there no reason suggested for the exemption, but also, the exemption is not conditioned upon any time table. Be that as it may, the tax-exempt status of the two utilities somehow distorts their discipline and profit-determined efficiency. Admittedly, the two bodies contribute in other ways to the national treasury. The ECG is expected to make "reasonable" payments to the consolidated fund. These payments may be considered as de facto tax and could amount to more than an assessed tax, but the payments are not defined 192 and are discretionary. 107 The VRA is also enjoined to administer the Akosombo township and this would make the Authority incur costs that could be more than the taxes it would have paid. This is also discretionary.
Notwithstanding an indication of government largesse to the two utilities, there were important statutory prescriptions for maintaining discipline in their respective accounts. The VRA is required to keep proper accounts and prepare annual statements of accounts as specified by the Auditor-General or as dictated by its business activities. 108 There is an annual audit of the accounts by an independent auditor. 109 Reports of the audited accounts together with an annual report of the entire activities of the VRA must be presented to the President and laid before Parliament. 110 Although the legal requirement for the preparation of a financial report and auditing of the VRA's accounts is welcome, the legislation does not indicate any specific criteria for the objective assessment of the report.
The apparent lack of detailed prescriptions for the financial statements of VRA must have informed the formulation of the financial provisions in the statute establishing the ECG. It specifies the contents of the financial statement. These include a balance sheet, income and expenditure statement, a statement of its surplus, any other information on the corporation's finance as may be demanded by the Minister for Energy. 111 A significant feature of the legal provisions on the ECG's financial statement is the explicit comparison with a publicly registered private company. 112 This is a healthy signal towards subjecting the ECG to the rigours of a private company. In the circumstances, it gives the ECG a dual character -a state-owned corporation operating on privately owned company financial principles. The provisions on auditing the accounts of the ECG also appear clearer and more exhaustive compared to those of the VRA. For example, the Auditor-General is required to state in his report whether in his opinion the income and expenditure account gives a true and fair view of the income and expenditure or profit and loss of the corporation for the financial year.
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He or she is also empowered to draw attention to any irregularity or impropriety or any matter which ought to be brought to the attention of the government. Copies of the report 107 There is hardly any record of payments made by the ECG to the state treasury. In fact, in view of its debilitating debts, the state has been subsidising its operations for a long time. 108 Section 26 of Act 46. 109 
Ibid.
110 Section 32 of Act 46.
111 Section 5 of PNDCL 250. 112 Section 13 (2)a of NLCD 125. 113 Ibid., section 14. are forwarded to the Board of Directors of the ECG, the Auditor General, the Minister of Finance, the Governor of the Central Bank and the Government Statistician. 114 The statutory provisions regarding the management of the accounts of the VRA and the ECG do not go far enough. For example, there is no requirement that the financial statements and auditors' reports be placed in the public domain. Despite some clarity in the ECG Decree, the requirements to be fulfilled in the reports themselves are vague and depend too much on the skill and integrity of the individual auditor. 115 Besides, considering the close relationship between the government and the utilities, there is reason for an apprehension that the reports might be influenced by political considerations. 116 The AuditorGeneral's Office, however, maintains a history of professionalism, independence and integrity. 117 This is reinforced by the provisions and practice of the new constitutional dispensation.
b) Commercial and Pricing Policy
Contrary to what some of the literature on state enterprises postulate, 119 the law requires the utilities in Ghana to operate on "sound commercial lines" and to make profit. 120 This legal injunction is realised in practice in widely differing forms by the VRA and the ECG. As already noted, the VRA generates power from hydro and gas sources and sells to VALCO, the mines, Akosombo, the Northern regions of Ghana and until very recently to Benin, Togo and Ivory Coast. The sale to VALCO and exports to Ghana's neighbours yield 114 Section 6 of PNDCL 250. In the original amendment in 1991 the National Energy Board was included in the list of recipients of annual reports on the state of affairs at the ECG. Unlike the VRA, the report of the audited accounts of the ECG is not placed before parliament. 115 substantial foreign exchange for the VRA. This is a crucial foundation for its historic solvency and buoyancy. On the other hand, the ECG buys power in bulk from the VRA and sells it exclusively to domestic consumers in Ghana. 121 In the face of frequent high domestic inflation, 122 poor performance by domestic industries 123 and therefore inability to pay power bills, illegal connections 124 and non-payment of bills by many consumers and administrative inefficiencies in the ECG, 125 it has not been solvent for most of its existence. 126 With continuing demands on the VRA to meet increasing domestic demands, it is feared that its enviable liquidity record would dwindle as it may encounter some of the difficulties that affect the solvency of the ECG. One way of holding the apprehension regarding the future liquidity of the utilities in check is a realistic tariff policy. Probably due to its special relationship with its prized customers, the law establishing the VRA is generally silent on the rates to charge for the power it generates, but in line with the special status of the VRA it was empowered to fix the rates at which it supplied power. 127 The clearly stated objective of any such tariff scheme is to attain commerciality and make profit. 128 There are about six categories of customers for VRA power -VALCO, exports, ECG, direct sales to Akosombo township, the mines and the northern sector of Ghana. 129 The relationship between the VRA and VALCO, including tariff, is governed by a master agreement. Under the original agreements, VALCO was paying 5 mills per kwh for the power it bought from the VRA. 130 This was revised in the renegotiated agreement at the instance of the Ghana government to 17 mills. 131 This is still lower than the rate of 25 mills paid by Togo and Benin for their imports from the VRA which is also covered by negotiated agreements. 132 The price charged by the VRA for bulk sales of power to ECG is 30 mills, still higher than that paid by VALCO. 133 VRA's domestic customers excluding the ECG pay about the same rates as those paid by consumers who receive power from the ECG. It is difficult to explain the variations in the prices paid by the various categories of power purchasers from the VRA especially the preferential rates accorded VALCO. One reason could be the historical contribution of the parent companies of VALCO to the eventual realisation of the Volta river project. The important fact to note is that VALCO and the importing countries paid their rates promptly and in hard currency. The importance of this cannot be overstated, especially in the light of the tariff collection difficulties of the ECG which sells exclusively to domestic consumers. (2000) 196
Net Profit as Percentage of Revenues from Electricity Sales for the VRA and the ECG
In enjoining the ECG to operate on sound commercial lines, the law stipulates that "in particular [it] prescribes the charges payable in respect of the supply of electricity as to ensure that its revenues are sufficient to produce on the fair value of its assets a reasonable return."
134 That return must be measured by taking the company's net operating incomes as a percentage of the fair value of its fixed assets in operation, plus an appropriate allowance for its working capital. Domestic power tariffs are generally based on Long Run Marginal Cost (LRMC). 135 This means that prices must reflect the economic costs of supplying electricity to enhance efficiency in resource allocation. The tariffs are supposed to be set on "cost-plus" basis which should allow for 8 percent rate of return on average net fixed assets. 136 There is no room in the law for direct government subsidy for power consumption.
Instead, a surtax is imposed on every unit of power consumed and the funds accumulated used to promote the national electrification programme, which is to extend power from the national grid to areas of the country without access to power.
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In reality, the pricing policy for domestic power consumption is influenced by a number of government related activities. In 1997, for example, the utilities adjusted their tariffs to reflect the principles of the law and the economics of providing the service. That revision upwards in the midst of drought-induced power rationing generated public discontent and in a characteristic dictatorial and populist style, President Jerry Rawlings, describing the new tariffs as "irresponsible", ordered the reduction of the rates. 138 The crisis generated by 134 NLCD 84. 135 Michael Opam, supra note 72. 136 
Ibid.
137 See Petroleum Taxation Law, 1993 (PNDCL 319). Excess Energy Consumption (Surcharges) Law, 1984 (PNDCL 87) . Contrary to the principle of rule of law that laws must be prospective and not retroactive, the Petroleum Taxation Law was made retroactive by about a year, and worse, made in the name of the military junta at a time when the Constitution was in effect. It has generally been the character of the Rawlings "legislature" to make its laws retroactive, or the law came into force when it was "made" rather than when it was published. 138 See Daily Graphic of 12 September 1997. The Minister for Energy stated that consumers, especially those in industry, were to pay three times what they were paying in 1997. See Van Ess, supra note 33. It must be recalled that under the then existing regulatory arrangement, power tariff were negotiated with the Ministry of Energy which in turn presented the agreed proposal to Cabinet which approved it. It is therefore surprising that the President ordered, on television and without going through the existing procedure, a suspension of the new tariffs. During the debate on the bill, an MP suggested the Rawlings government did not allow a previous revision of tariffs because of an impending general election. Ibid. The manipulation of electricity rates for political purposes is not unique to Ghana. In the Canadian province of Quebec, it has been established that there is a direct correlation between electricity prices and elections. See the drought, expansion in the domestic demand for power, the increase in tariffs and the order to reduce it, served as the immediate impetus for the establishment, by an Act of Parliament, of the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PUC).
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With its background located in tariff crisis, it is not surprising that the law establishing the PUC makes it essentially a tariff regulatory agency. In that respect, it appears largely weighed against the utilities. The commission is made up of nine persons largely appointed by the President in consultation with the Council of State. 140 The qualifications indicated for membership of the Commission are almost entirely in favour of consumers, yet in theory it is supposed to be independent. 141 The PUC is, to inter alia, provide guidelines on the rates chargeable for provision of utility services, and to examine and approve rates chargeable for the provision of utility services. This means that the utilities do not have the ultimate say regarding domestic tariffs. 142 With the Commission heavily weighed in favour of consumers, there is an apprehension that welfare maximising at the expense of price efficiency, and ultimately maintenance, planning and general survival of the utilities may hold sway. On the other hand, a quasi-independent regulatory body may be better placed to regulate tariffs than a government ministry. Besides, there are provisions in the Act that require the PUC to protect the interests of the utility providers as well as consumers. 143 In conducting studies relating to the economy and efficiency of public utilities, promoting fair competition among the utilities, as enjoined by the law, the PUC would invariably have to face the reality of the true costs of power services and the need for allowances for depreciation, maintenance, planning etc, and the need for reasonable profit margin for the continuing viability of the utilities. This is reinforced by the fact that in determining tariffs, the PUC is enjoined to balance the equities of production and consumption by taking into account the interests of the consumer, investor, the cost of production of the service and 139 Ibid. Public Utilities Regulatory Commission Act 1997 (Act 538). Commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority in the performance of its functions, but if its membership is weighed in favour of consumers, in reality it would be under the direction of consumers. Under section 7 of the Act, the Chairman and members of the Commission are to be paid such allowance as the President may determine. 142 The possible conflict between section 21 (4) of Act 46 (empowering the VRA to fix the rates at which it supplies electrical power) and section 3 (a-c) of Act 538 (on the approval of tariffs by the PUC) is effectively dealt with by the repeal of section 21 (4) of Act 46. See section 50 (2) of Act 538. 143 Ibid., section 3 (c). Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 33 (2000) 198 assurance of the financial integrity of the public utility. 144 In a way then, the PUC initiative may be an instrument for the viable operation of the utilities, especially the ECG which depends entirely on domestic consumers for its revenue.
The determination of tariffs is a classic point where the issue of equity is played out. It is important that the utilities charge prices that would make them efficient in terms of profit, smooth technical operations and fulfil their obligations under the law. To this end, the power utilities have in recent times been pleading with the government and consumers to accept realistic tariffs to allow them to operate efficiently. 145 At the same time, if the prices are outside the reach of the consumer, specifically the domestic consumer, they may have to cut down on supply activity as power cannot be stored. Besides, high power rates or no power supplies could engender political tension and possibly unrest. That would undermine the stability of the industry. Additionally, the extension of power to hitherto deprived areas, including communities which bore the brunt of the hydro electric project, would appear to be an equitable initiative. However, the extension of power to areas of low economic, especially low industrial activity, would prolong the gestation of the investment. The alternative might be to concentrate on the high yielding markets like the export market, VALCO and the mines. This is the dilemma that the utilities, especially the VRA, finds itself in. The solution would have to be one that favours a tariff regime that allows a reasonable profit margin for the utilities. This would help attract more investors and competition that would ultimately depress prices. 146 In the short term, the profit margins on domestic consumers may be lower than on industrial consumers. 147 The accumulated capital may be deployed gradually in less economically attractive areas with the aim of stimulating development as to ultimately restore parity. This issue would inevitably confront the PUC. George Sydney Abugri, What do we Pay, Mr Hagan? (On file with the author). 146 The Minister for Finance, Kwame Peprah (then also responsible for Energy) reiterated the need to attract private investment to the energy sector to help extend power to parts of the country that did not have access. Http://www.uta.fi/¬csfraw/ghana/news/august.html (visited 17/9/99). 147 It is therefore puzzling that the VRA charges the higher rate of 30 mills to the ECG and the lower rates of 25 mills to Togo and Benin and still lower rate of 17 to VALCO. 148 This controversy over realistic tariffs and the equitable distribution of power is very important in view of the government's determination to expand accessibility to these resources. The President and his advisers indicated this inevitable dilemma at the inauguration of the PUC, stating that "it is not going to be easy", and urged the members to "come out with tariff proposals which would be acceptable to all segments of society". The President asked the members to educate the people on the use of power and water resources. See note 140 supra. Hopefully, this should extend to public presentation of the costs of power production and the need for continual maintenance works.
Given the fairly contentious potential of the tariff-fixing, and indeed, the entire regulatory process, including the promotion of competition, the absence of a dispute resolution mechanism built into the utility regulatory regime is conspicuous. 149 Perhaps, it has been taken for granted that the general national judicial infrastructure is capacitous enough to deal with controversies arising from the energy regulatory system. 150 The comfort from this assumption can be cold, in fact. Apart from the interminable delays in the Ghanaian judicial process which is inconterminous with the energy business, the energy industry is very technical and one that consumes huge capital. Its technical mechanism is both complex and unique. It is for these reasons that, at the minimum, an arbitration mechanism or other expeditious dispute resolution scheme well-suited to the exigencies of the industry would be necessary. This omission in the domestic system was, fortunately, not repeated in the international energy network in the West African region.
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In general, the PUC cuts into the relative independence of the VRA and adds to the bureaucratic chain of regulation of the ECG. It appears that the PUC shares the supervisory functions of the Ministries of Energy and Finance over the utilities, although its primary concern relates to tariffs. Unfortunately, it is not a replacement for the defunct NEB. It does not have explicit public energy awareness and conservation function, and it does not have technical expertise accumulation function. Finally, it oversees not only energy but all utilities including water and sewerage. Its impact on the performance of the energy utilities and the industry as a whole is yet to be ascertained. One thing is clear. The fixation of tariffs is not the prerogative of the utility monopolies, nor subject to the direct vicissitudes of politi-149 Sections 29-32 of Act 538 provide for the receipt of complaints and handling of the same by the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission. This is unsatisfactory as some of the disputes arising from the regulatory process may be more than mere complaints. Significantly, the said complaints may be against the Commission itself, for example by the utilities. In that case, it cannot be said that the Commission would sit in judgement over cases brought against it. 150 The hint for this is given by section 29 (4), stating that the Commission does not have power to investigate any matter pending before a court of law, and section 32 empowering the Commission to seek the assistance of the High Court in enforcing its decisions. 151 Article 8 of the West African Gas Agreement, discussed below, provides for the resolution of disputes arising from the agreement by arbitration proceeding in accordance with the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 
c) Environmental Dimensions
A subject that did not escape the people who conceived the Volta river project is the environmental consequences of the project. 155 In the democratic environment at the time, in a bid to assuage possible discontent of the people to be directly affected by the project and to ensure the long term stability of the project, an extensive public consultation and education was mounted by President Nkrumah's government. 156 Chiefs and other leaders of the towns and communities to be affected were also incorporated into the project from its initiation to completion. 157 A local chief, Nene Azu Mate Korle II of Manya Krobo, for example, whose jurisdiction covered parts of the project site was a member of the Legislative Assembly that approved the project and also served as a member of the Board of Directors of the VRA.
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It must be pointed out, however, that as the project made its way through various processes and agencies for finance, the environmental considerations at some stages were not top priority. The dynamics of the finance for the project and the environmental consequences is yet another reason for a substantial and novel involvement of the state in the industry.
The VRA was charged with the construction of a dam and power station and for the creation of a lake by damning the river Volta. It is to cause the lake to fill by the accumulation of water upstream to a range of 240 ft and 280 ft for efficient technical operations. 159 It was not unexpected that large tracts of land would be inundated. An area of 85,000 sq.km or five percent of the territory of Ghana was inundated and some 78,000 people from seven sation and functioning is such that there is representation from diverse backgrounds, it has mechanism for soliciting and receiving public input, there are provisions for judicial hearing and redress of discontent with various aspects of the industry and it is accountable to peoples' elected representatives. See sections 2, 4, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 37 of Act 538. 153 The legitimacy may come from a perception that the PUC is independent, especially for consumers. 154 The stability of tariffs is largely guaranteed by the Act providing for uniform rates for domestic consumers and prior notice of impending revisions of tariffs. See sections 18, 20, 21 and 22. 155 David Hart, supra note 25, 22.
156 James Moxon, supra note 25, at p. 64 and 73-74. The programme was more of public education about the project rather than solicitation of the views of those affected. 157 Ibid. hundred towns and villages had to be resettled in about 52 locations. 160 The Act establishing the VRA provided for acquisition of lands, compensation and resettlement of people who were expected to be displaced by the project. The President was empowered to authorise the acquisition of land which in the opinion of the Authority will or may be inundated by the filling of the lake and which would be necessary for the efficient operation of the project. 161 The dual functions of the President in regard to the Authority have become manifest in this provision. On the one hand he acquires the lands in his capacity as head of state. That is why the lands are vested in him in trust for the service of the people. 162 On the other hand, he as chairman, together with the Authority assesses which lands will be inundated or would be necessary for the purposes of the project and acquires, controls and administers the said lands. The conflict in the two positions is apparent.
The courses of action open to the people whose lands were affected by the project lay in compensation and resettlement. Compensation may be monetary or in non-monetary assistance towards resettlement, or combination of the two. 163 The compensation package cannot be challenged solely on the grounds that it was non-monetary. 164 The law thus appears to lean more towards resettlement of the people dislocated by the project than to pay monetary compensation to them. This might have been founded on good moral, not necessarily economic principles. The state would like to prevent long and expensive compensation assessment and other procedures. The desire to avoid the vicissitudes of inflation and other economic changes that could effectively render the people homeless, might also have informed the statutory bent. On the other hand, the almost total foreclosure on monetary claims could create difficulties of capital creation and settlement. The government's broader interests thus predominated the social and environmental issues arising from the project.
Moreover, government departments and other public authorities were to co-operate with the VRA in the discharge of the latter's functions. 165 Specifically in the resettlement scheme, however, not clear the extent to which the Minister could go to ensure that no person suffers undue hardship or is deprived of necessary public amenities as a result of the resettlement. The overriding criteria for the assessment should be the satisfaction of the people. Given the government's interest in seeing to the completion of the project and minimising costs to itself, a vigorous representation of the interests and views of the people affected in a democratic environment with guarantees of freedoms of speech, association, legal and other professional assistance is absolutely necessary.
There are also no environmental provisions in the law establishing the ECG despite the fact that thermal power generation, transmission and distribution of power have environmental implications. It might appear then that the environmental consequences of the energy industry are regulated by the general national laws on the environment, in particular the Environmental Protection Agency Act. 167 This Act established the Environmental Protection
Agency, prescribed the membership of the board, 168 and gave the agency powers to enforce environmental laws and regulations. Crucially, it requires the conduct of environmental impact assessment of all-important projects in Ghana. 169 This means that energy projects in Ghana must conduct environmental impact assessment and co-operate with the EPA in the performance of its functions. Two drawbacks of this legislation are that it does not retroactively apply to previous energy projects and most crucially, there is no comprehensive environmental law to enforce. To date, there are still grievances against the resettlement packages and processes. Clearly, the health consequences of the project does not appear to have been satisfactorily dealt with. 170 In 1964, two years before President Nkrumah was overthrown in a military coup, and two years before the hydro-electric plant was commissioned, the country moved to a one party state and with that, severe curtailment on basic freedoms such as association and speech were instituted. This continued with all successive 166 Section 29 of Act 46.
167 Environmental Protection Agency Act, 1994 (Act 490). 168 The Chairman of the board since its creation is retired General Quainoo who was a former Armed military regimes. 171 In that environment, the adequate and rigorous representation of the interests of the people affected by the Volta project can hardly be said to have been pursued. Notwithstanding these political and environmental tensions, the project continued and within a short time internationalised into the West African sub region.
d) International Dynamics
There are four imperatives that place the energy industry in Ghana firmly in the international arena. These are the historical origins of the Volta hydro-electric project; the nature and source of the river Volta; the export to and relationships with neighbouring countries; and changes in the global energy market including the presence of IPPs.
The possibility of generating hydro-electric power from the river Volta was first conceived in 1915 by Sir Albert Kitson during the colonial era. 172 At various times the idea was shelved mainly on financial grounds. Most of the research work on the project was done by researchers from the UK, South Africa, Australia, USA, Canada and Ghana. 173 At various points, the UK, the USA and the Canadian governments showed interest in the project. Eventually, the financial package was put together by the Ghana government, the US government and the World Bank. 174 The US government also supported Kaiser Aluminium and Reynolds Metals with loan guarantees that enhanced the project's momentum, with the two companies committing themselves to the building of a smelter that would buy the bulk of the power generated, and therefore the project's viability. 175 The dam itself was constructed by an array of hydro-electric engineering and construction firms led by Impregilo, an Italian company. 176 Since its commissioning, it has been manned almost exclusively by 173 See generally James Moxon, supra note 25. 174 The Ghana government provided $98 million, the US government $27 million, US government Exim bank $10 million, mortgage loan to VALCO $96 million. The UK government provided export credit guarantees to the tune of $14 million to the VRA. The Ghana government also guaranteed the loans to VRA. See the detailed outline of the financing package in David Hart, supra note 25, at p. 31. 175 ally, the ongoing construction of the Combined Cycle Gas Turbine project in the western region is funded jointly by the US government, the VRA and the government of Ghana.
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The lead engineering company is CMS Generation Company from the USA.
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This array of international players have brought their own dynamics to the energy industry in Ghana and its governance. The contribution of the World Bank has ensured an external oversight that helped assure the relative independence of the VRA and its continuing attraction to international financial interests. The presence of VALCO as a technically demanding and fastidious customer has contributed to the acclaimed technical efficiency of the VRA. Crucially, the regulatory framework for the energy industry has had to constantly take account of the needs and concerns of VALCO. 181 Finally, the presence of international financial and engineering interests placed Ghana as a terminus for financial interests and also helped transfer essential expertise and technology to the country and its people. Ironically, the complex network of interests in VRA's activities and therefore the energy industry as a whole in Ghana has ensured the stability of the industry comparable to those in industrialised countries.
The physical location -source and course -of the river Volta itself guaranteed the internationalisation of a project of that magnitude. William Fayorsey, 'VRA, US Company to Manage Thermal Plant', in: Ghanaian Times, 1 October, 1996 at p. 12. The U.S. Export-Import Bank provided a loan of $316 million for the GNPC'S Western Power project. The plant itself is monitored by Westinghouse in Florida via a satellite link. See 'Ghana floating power plant', supra note 58. Even the rural electrification programme is supported with foreign loans, for example by the French and Japanese governments. See 'Japan Gives 4.7 Million Dollars For Rural Electrification' (GNA, 17/9/96). 'Ghana, French Company Sign 18 Million-Dollar Deal', http://www.uta.fi/csfraw/ghana/news/enews.html (visited 17/9/96). It is important to note that these loans are guaranteed by the government of Ghana. 181 Under the original 1961 Master Agreement, the laws of Ghana were frozen at 1961 for thirty years. That is, no law that would adversely affect directly or indirectly the interests of VALCO could be passed. 182 James Moxon, supra note 25, at p. 23-24.
Gas Pipeline project, imports of power from Ivory Coast, the development of alternative sources of energy in Ghana and the involvement of Independent Power Producers, all contextualised in the ECOWAS treaty requirements of removal of customs duties, taxes and other charges on imports from member states, how would the government respond to "over supply" of energy products and the resulting competition?
Under the terms of the ECOWAS treaty Ghana cannot levy more charges on gas from Nigeria than it does gas from home. Nor can it impose higher charges on electricity from Ivory Coast than it does power from Ghana. Even if it levies equivalent charges on both imported and domestic energy, it has to do it in a way that will not move consumers from gas to hydro-power or vice versa, otherwise Nigeria or any of the signatory countries can petition on grounds of discriminatory policy. This is a two-edged sword for Ghana. On the one hand, consumers would reap the benefits of low and conceivably stable prices, and this would engender long term growth in the economy. In the short term, the government would lose the tax revenue it gets from gas and other energy sources.
The Gas Agreement and its proposed West Africa Pipeline Company (WAPCO) is itself not devoid of difficulties. 198 The motivation for the establishment of the WAPCO is to put the gas transactions under the Gas Agreement on purely commercial lines. 199 It is to be incorporated in a country agreed to by the parties, owned by private and public enterprises, and operate on commercial principles. 200 It is to be the owner of the pipeline and the carrier of the gas. 201 Comparable models of the WAPCO may be rare. To some extent, the proposed steering committee together with the WAPCO itself comes very close to the joint development method, often employed where the resource is located across jurisdictions, except that in this instance, the Gas Agreement does not relate to gas located across national frontiers. 202 It is for the fact that the gas is located in one country, Nigeria, and is to be carried and sold to other three countries that the issue of choice of law that would govern the WAPCO, becomes important. This relates to both the law to govern the arrangements for percent citing the devaluation of the Ghanaian currency and changes in prices of imported crude oil. It also increased liquefied petroleum gas by 123 percent from 5,700 to 12,000 cedis. See Ghanaian Chronicle, 1-4 March 1997. These price hikes do affect the demand for gas adversely and this may have implications for the Gas Agreement and regional trade in view of the fact that the gas market is only nascent. For more on investment in gas exploration and its market imperatives see Gerald Greenwald, Encouraging Natural Gas Exploration Policies, in: Nicky Beredjick / Thomas Walde (eds.), Petroleum Investment Policies in Development Countries, 1988, p. 175-202. 198 Article 3 of the Gas Agreement.
209 ernment and the Eyadema government in Togo are clouded by mutual distrust and suspicion. 209 In the midst of all these, the VRA's exploits in regional power trade is all the more remarkable. 210 To expand beyond the existing status quo, however, would require not particular governments being in power perpetually, but the effective institution of democratic structures in individual countries that would serve as credible channels for regional co-operation. In that case, the credibility and legitimacy of agreements and policy strategies would survive the particular government which adopted them. 211 Credibility, survival and progress of the energy industry appear to receive a shot in the arm by global trends. Two phenomena appear particularly striking in the global circumstances. These are the search for alternatives and preferably more environmentally-friendly sources of energy and second, the reorganisation of the structures for exploiting and managing the industry, often referred to as privatisation or deregulation. Two sets of circumstances motivated the global moves. These are the oil crisis of the 1970s that engendered the search for cheaper and environmentally-friendly energy, and the end of the cold war in 1990 eased the security concerns that placed the energy sector at the heart of political strategies. 212 The end of the cold war also released unprecedented democratic fervour that gave vent to alternative paradigms for economic and energy resource development, including, in particular, private sector led development. These dynamics played out in the energy industry in Ghana.
For the first time in decades, freely elected Parliament debated a bill on the energy sector. This is important in the institutionalisation of democratic governance. On the environmental front, the enthusiasm for gas-based energy as evidenced in the CCGT project in the Tano basin, is not only engendered by the need for more power but also to reduce dependence on wood fuel as well as a manifestation of the drive for cleaner energy. In addition,
VI. Conclusion
This article has shown the roles played by the state in the energy industry in Ghana with somewhat contrasting consequences. The support of the state has taken mainly the form of financial assistance, the management of the environmental and social impact of the industry and its international connections. Two contradictions have been identified in this work. The first is the place of governance in the energy industry in Ghana. What may appear to be an adherence to the precepts of good governance in the case of the ECG -under Ministerial supervision and attempt to separate it from the political process -yielded inefficiency. A bypass of the elements of good governance in the case of the VRA yielded efficiency and good economic out-turn. The contradiction can be explained away as follows: The VRA's success owes as much to President Nkrumah's personal commitment and sagacity as to the role of international players such as the World Bank, VALCO, the countries that import power from the VRA, and the commitment of its staff. To that extent, the failure of the ECG might appear to be due to its exclusively domestic focus. This then leads to the second contradiction.
The precepts of good governance are less critical where the industry is internationalised. But, the success of the VRA in the export market is fast dwindling. 220 Although it is making efforts to halt the decline as evidenced in the new investment initiative with the CCGT project, 221 it could have prevented it if both Presidents Nkrumah and Limann's plans for the third project at Bui had not been stalled by military interventions and the consequent suppression of democratic freedoms. Furthermore, the durability and viability of large-scale projects as the West African Gas Pipeline project can only be guaranteed if state stability under-girded by good governance prevailed in the region. The durable, equitable and efficient operation of the energy industry domestically and internationally, cannot be left to the benevolence of a particular government. The vehicle to achieve that, it is maintained, is good governance -evidenced in technically efficient and independent bureaucracy, rule of law, the real existence of freedoms such as speech, association, assembly and the judicious use of governmental discretion. 220 The general success of the Volta project is tempered by the severe environmental impact on people in the catchment areas of the river. Perhaps if basic democratic freedoms had existed through the life of the project, the environmental consequences would have been articulated and ventilated in a robust manner, and hopefully dealt with more effectively. 221 'VRA, US Company to Manage Thermal Plant', Ghanaian Times 1/10/96, at p. 12.
